Hashemites and Zionists: The Post-War Anglo-Arab Relationship and the Failure of the One State Solution

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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a divisive issue in U.S. foreign policy. This becomes especially obvious during an election year. In all of the debates that emerge over the possible solutions, a common theme emerges—the two-state solution. This plan would partition Palestine between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis. While parties disagree on the specifics, hardly anyone denies the political necessity of separate Israeli and Palestinian states. Because of this, it seems almost inconceivable today that another solution ever existed. Between 1918 and 1919, the most promising answer lay in a single nation where both Jews and Arabs held joint political power and equal rights. However, changes in the political situation made the multi-ethnic, one-state solution unattainable. The question thus arises: What major changes rendered the one-state solution impractical? The complex diplomacy that followed World War I between the British, the French, the Zionists, and the Hashemite Arabs shaped the formation of the Palestinian Mandate with Anglo-Arab relations playing an especially crucial role. Ultimately, the failure of the British government to keep its wartime agreements with the Hashemite Arabs hindered the peaceful establishment of a multi-ethnic state in Palestine.

The Anglo-Arabian alliance was born out of crisis. The outbreak of World War I ignited colonial rivalries that had flared on and off throughout the late 19th century. In the Near East, the aging Ottoman Empire, allied with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, faced the combined might of the British and Russian Empires, members of the Triple Entente. However, against all odds, the Ottomans resisted.

The British planned their Near Eastern Campaign from Cairo. After war had broken out with the Ottoman Empire, the many British civil servants in Cairo, under the direction of Lord Kitchener, began planning their vision of the post-war Near East. They hoped to destroy the Ottoman Empire and set in its place a new Arab Caliphate, such as had existed during the Middle Ages, administered from Cairo. However, the India Office, the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Admiralty all had separate postwar plans. Mark Sykes, a prominent member of the British War Office, suggested that the British
government establish a separate Arab Bureau to ensure unified policy in the region. None of the bureaus, however, wanted to relinquish their power to a new agency. As a result, the British created the Arab Bureau as a small branch of the Cairo Intelligence Department. Consequently, it received little information from the Foreign Office or War Office. The lack of a coordinated British policy in the Near East greatly hindered the peace process.

One of the many concerns of the Arab Bureau was maintaining friendly relations with Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca. As the war progressed, it became increasingly clear that Germany was pressuring the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid to pursue a policy of pan-Islamic Holy War against the British. However, the Holy War proclaimed by the Sultan needed the added legitimacy of the support of a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. Sharif Husayn claimed this descent as a member of the Hashemite clan. The British in Cairo realized the importance of Husayn to the Sultan’s strategy. In 1914 Lord Kitchener, the Vice-Royal of Egypt, made an agreement of non-aggression with the Sharif to ensure that he would not attack the Suez Canal.

The signing of this treaty led the Turks to begin to doubt Husayn’s loyalty. They feared that before long, he would openly support the British. Confirming these fears, Husayn refused to endorse the Holy War. The Sultan, recognized as the caliph of Islam, had proclaimed the Holy War, but it was the Young Turks who advocated it most vocally. Husayn deeply disliked the Young Turks, whom he saw as a threat to traditional Islamic values and a symbol of secular Turkish nationalism. In response, the Sultan began planning to replace Husayn with a more loyal descendant of the Prophet. Word of this reached Husayn. Realizing that a Turkish victory would mean the end of his family’s prominence, he turned to the Arab separatists within the Ottoman Army for assistance. They encouraged Husayn to begin negotiating an alliance with Britain.

Husayn could not have chosen a better time to begin corresponding with the British. His first letter to Sir Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner of Egypt, in July 1915 came during the disastrous British campaign at Gallipoli. Unable to defeat the “Sick Man of Europe,” Great Britain desperately needed allies.

In his first letter, Husayn demanded that Britain recognize Arab independence in exchange for Arab assistance to defeat the Turks. Husayn listed the boundaries of his kingdom-to-be as the area between the 37th parallel north, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. While willing to concede to Britain economic privileges within that area, he was clear that he wanted complete political independence. McMahon replied enthusiastically to Husayn’s promise to lead a rebellion against the Turks, but was reluctant to make any promises regarding boundaries. Clearly, McMahon was aware that Husayn was not the only one with future interests in the Near East and wanted to win the Sharif’s support with the minimal promises in return. Husayn, however, recognized this tactic immediately and wrote back that he viewed the refusal to agree on boundaries as a sign of deceit between potential allies. McMahon gave in to Husayn’s demand and tentatively agreed to Husayn’s
boundaries with the exclusion of “the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, the area laying to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo...[and] the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra.” Husayn must have had suspicions of European interference within the former Ottoman Empire, and this confirmed his worst fears. He wrote back that under no circumstances would he surrender the coastal regions of Aleppo and Beirut. Thus, the dispute over Syria had its roots at the very beginning of the Anglo-Arab alliance.

It would have been far better if McMahon had settled this dispute over Syria in his correspondence with Husayn; however, he failed to do so. He argued to Husayn that the French had interests in Aleppo and Beirut and that giving that land to Husayn would adversely affect the Anglo-French alliance. Husayn diplomatically responded that while he did not wish to complicate relations with Syria, he would insist on the inclusion of Aleppo and Beirut in the Arab state. Tactfully, not wishing to endanger the possibility of an Arab revolt, McMahon expressed his appreciation to Husayn for not wishing to cause conflict between British and French interests; however, he made no mention of Husayn’s continued insistence on coastal Syria. This indicates just how desperately the British needed allies. They intentionally hedged a crucial diplomatic dispute in order to secure the Arab alliance. Their eagerness for Husayn to begin his revolt at the cost of leaving the Syrian question unresolved throughout the entire war would have dire consequences later.

Nevertheless, the gamble paid off in the short term for Britain. Assured by McMahon of Britain’s support, Husayn initiated the revolt. In February 1916 Husayn sent his last letter to McMahon informing Britain that his son Faisal was now leading the Arab Revolt and had requested £50,000 in gold, large amounts of food supplies, and 5,000 rifles. Britain had found an ally against the Ottoman Turks. With victory looking more certain, the question remained—who would share the spoils?

The British had good reason to believe that they could defeat the Ottomans if they could concentrate enough forces on this front. However, the French were opposed to any plans that would transfer British troops away from the Western Front in 1916. In order to make this transfer worthwhile to French interests the British offered territorial compensation in the Near East.

The land that France most coveted was Syria. Large communities of Lebanese Catholics—Maronites—lived in the coastal regions of Syria. The French had long desired to govern the Maronite enclaves who traced their ancestry back to the Crusades. Britain was willing to let the French govern Syria. If the Entente won the war, it would almost guarantee Russian expansion into the Caucasus. For nearly a century, Britain had competed with Russia for influence over Central Asia in what was known as the Great Game. A French colony in Syria would lessen the tensions that would arise from adjoining Russian and British territory.

Mark Sykes, who had been instrumental in the establishment of the Arab Bureau, represented the British in their negotiations with France. Sykes knew that the sooner French ambitions could be quantified, the less anxious the Arab leaders would be about European intentions. For a man so committed to
reconciling the competing interests of European Powers and Arab Nationalists, he could hardly have done a worse job creating a compromise.

In the final form of the Sykes-Picot agreement, France gained direct colonial control over coastal Syria, Aleppo, and Mersina; Britain gained Basra in Southern Mesopotamia. In addition, Sykes created two zones of influence—one for Britain and one for France. These zones of influence essentially provided British and French protection over a collection of Arab states. The French zone consisted of interior Syria and the British zone of Northern Mesopotamia. Sykes, like most British in Cairo, never actually believed that the Arabs were, as a nation, capable of self-government in a Western sense. He felt that, at minimum, indirect European rule was required for the Arab states. As none of the area promised to Husayn fell within the areas of direct British or French control, he believed that his treaty perfectly reconciled European and Arab interests. In this belief he could not have been more mistaken. As mentioned before in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the most control that Husayn was willing to accept from Britain was economic influence. Nowhere had McMahon mentioned military and political interference. Most of the Arab Bureau objected as well. Gilbert Clayton, who was its head, was outraged at Sykes for giving an Arab state French protection. It was Britain who funded the Arab Revolt; it was Britain who backed Arab separatism; and, therefore, it should have been Britain who received the protectorate over all Arab states. Far from satisfying the interests of the parties involved, Sykes-Picot created more problems than it solved. Even if Sykes-Picot had resolved the conflicting interests of the French, British, and Arabs, an additional party soon joined the debate over the future of the Near East—the Zionists. Like many 19th century politicians, both British and German leaders overestimated the power of the global Jewish community. The Kaiser had great hopes of winning the Jews over to the Central Powers. He believed that of all the powers, the Jews hated Russia the most. If the Germans could persuade them to join the war and rebel against Russia, it could mean eliminating an entire theater of operations from the war. This was just the kind of conspiracy that the British feared. Mark Sykes and Arthur Balfour were among those British politicians who most feared a global Jewish conspiracy. They believed that winning the Jews over to the Entente would help decide the outcome of the war. This prejudice, coupled with Prime Minister Lloyd George’s religious zeal and his undersecretary Leo Amery’s understanding of the strategic importance of Palestine, led to the issuing of the Balfour Declaration of 1917. This declaration—barely two paragraphs long—stated that Great Britain would establish in Palestine “a national homeland for the Jewish people.” Never before in any negotiations with Husayn had the British excluded Palestine from the Arab state. Now suddenly Balfour unilaterally offered Palestine to the Zionists. To this day, no one has successfully resolved this inconsistency of British foreign policy; however, one attempt came close.

In January 1919, a little over two months after the last shots of World
War I were fired, Arab and Zionist leaders created one of the most unusual documents in the history of the Near Eastern conflict. The delegations at the Paris Peace Conference had the enormous responsibility of shaping the post-war order. It was in the course of these many months of debate that Faisal—representing the Arabs on behalf of his father—and Chaim Weizmann—representing the Zionists—met. The two men had much in common—they both represented nationalist movements with much at stake in the peace process, and they both had apprehensions about the British. Faisal continued to worry about whether the British would honor their agreement with France over the fate of Syria, which he was determined to keep as part of the Arab state. He feared that they would. He doubted whether they had any intent to fulfill the obligations of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. Likewise, Weizmann had heard rumors that the British were considering reneging on the Balfour Declaration in light of the strong anti-Zionist tension among the Arabs in Palestine. However, the British suggested that if Weizmann could win the support of the Arab leadership and demonstrate that his aims did not pose a threat to the Arab movement, then he would continue to receive British support.

In their first meeting, it became evident that they each had much to offer the other. As previously mentioned, the British were reluctant to endorse a policy which would make ruling Palestine difficult. If Weizmann could win Faisal’s support of Zionism, it would mean British support as well. However, what did Weizmann have to offer Faisal? Faisal expressed to Weizmann just how weak the Arab movement was. The provisional Arab government had no money, very little military, and no urban center from which a government could rule effectively. He expressed how the Sykes-Picot agreement would leave Syria a backward nation with little hope of future development. Weizmann capitalized on Faisal’s political weakness by offering to aid him in his fight against Sykes-Picot, which Weizmann claimed was just as detrimental to the Zionist cause. He also promised Faisal that he would promote the Arab cause in America. Even more importantly, however, Weizmann offered full Jewish financial support for the economic development of Syria. In all likelihood, it is doubtful that Weizmann and Feisal made these promises out of genuine sympathy for the other’s cause, but it is clearly evident that both understood the political necessity of supporting the other, even if that meant having to compromise.

T.E. Lawrence, the notorious British officer of nearly mythical status who served as Faisal’s British liaison officer, penned the final wording of their agreement. The goal was to tie Zionist and Arab nationalist movements together in order to improve the chances of the success of both. The agreement consisted of ten articles. The first article proposed the “one-state” solution. Rather than establishing separate Arab and Jewish states in Palestine or a single Arab or Jewish state, Article One established joint Arab-Jewish cooperation in a national government. This government would be constitutionally established and fully independent of European powers. The treaty guaranteed that there would be no exclusion from representation in the
government based on religious creed. It also promised full civil rights to all citizens regardless of their beliefs. Once established, the government would allow— but also encourage unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine, while ensuring the land rights of the existing population. In order to further soothe any Arab apprehensions over unlimited Jewish immigration, the agreement also provided for control of the Holy Places by the Muslim population. To gain Faisal’s support even further, the treaty promised that the Jews would both plan and finance the development of agriculture and infrastructure in Arab Syria. Lastly, the agreement recognized that future conflict was still a possibility. In the case that a conflict between Palestine and Arab Syria ever arose, the British would act as an international arbitrator. Before signing it, Faisal added an additional piece of insurance for the Arab cause. To this document he wrote, “Provided that the Arabs obtain their independence…I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made, I shall not be bound by a single word of this present Agreement which shall be deemed void…” This emendation made it clear that the responsibility of the success or failure of this agreement rested solely on the British honoring the terms of the Husayn-McMahon letters.

The series of events between the last months of conflict and the late months of 1919 proved to be the crucial period for the development of Palestine. British foreign policy in the Near East during this period turned decisively against the Arabs and became increasingly pro-French. This turn of events brought into effect the end provision that Faisal had amended to the Weizmann-Faisal agreement, thus nullifying it.

In the fall of 1918, British forces continued their advance northward through Palestine into Syria. General Allenby commanded the forces that had previously liberated Jerusalem from Turkish rule and were now on the verge of driving the Turks from Damascus. Allenby, however, was cautious of the effect a European army would have on the local population and, therefore, wanted Faisal’s army to be the first to enter Damascus. After Faisal’s arrival, Allenby’s army would arrive. He would then be responsible for setting up a temporary Arab government under Faisal’s authority in the interior of Syria. French officials, in accordance with Sykes-Picot, would then move in to assist Faisal with the administration of civil law while the British would continue to provide military stability. At some future point, the British would withdraw leaving an Arab state led by Faisal under French protection. That, at least, was the plan.

On October 1 the Turks abandoned Damascus. No one had anticipated an Ottoman retreat that suddenly. The local Arab population reacted quickly and established a self-governing body. When word reached the Arab army, at the time under the leadership of T.E. Lawrence and Nuri-al-Sa’id, Lawrence rode north to Damascus and quickly ensured that a pro-Faisal representative led the provisional council. Lawrence hoped that by claiming that the Arabs had liberated Damascus without British assistance, they would be able to claim an independent state free of French control. The arrival of Allenby the next day dashed these hopes. He informed the Arabs of the agreement under which the
British were operating. France would become the protector of a Syrian Arab state; Faisal would govern from Damascus; Syria would not include coastal Lebanon; and Faisal would have French advisors and financial support. When Faisal received these terms, he declared them unacceptable. It was unacceptable that the Arabs would not be completely independent, but it was even worse that they were getting French colonialism as well. The future of the Near East became increasingly complicated in light of intense Arab hatred of the French.

The Arab revulsion toward the French stemmed from their declaration that they would favor Lebanese Christian rule over the Muslim population. As word of the impending French take-over mounted, Syria stood on the brink of rebellion. Faisal shared in his people’s dislike of the French. He warned the British that if they withdrew and allowed France to take control, he would not be able to control any subsequent violence. Later Sir M. Henkey described a meeting with Faisal as being “distinctly menacing when he spoke of what would happen if French troops were to come into Syria.” As most of the British in Near East objected to the terms of Sykes-Picot, it is not surprising that many sympathized with this Arab dislike of French rule. Arthur Balfour noted increased instances of reports of British field officers trying to stir up Arab resistance to the French occupiers in order to establish grounds for a British protectorate.

Such reports put a great strain on Anglo-French relations. The French believed that this action by British officers represented an official policy of the Foreign Office in London or even Lloyd George’s instructions. They suspected that the British intended to break their promises and govern interior Syria themselves. Balfour tried to see the situation from the French viewpoint. He noted that the British had already modified the Sykes-Picot agreement so that they could have Mosul and Palestine. Then, after the French had agreed to this, they requested Palmyra and Southern Lebanon. These rumors from Syria seemed to further the impression of a widespread British plot to drive the French from the Near East.

The British government, however, completely denied having an anti-French policy in the Near East. Prime Minister Lloyd George insisted that he had specifically rejected a British protectorate in Syria so as not to offend the French. This raises a crucial question, however. Why did the British government fear alienating the French more than they did the local Arab population?

French public opinion was extremely important to the British in the post-war world. Given Russian hostility toward the Entente Powers following the Bolshevik Revolution and America’s return to its traditional peacetime isolationism, France was Britain’s only hope for a postwar ally. The French praised the restoration of Anglo-French relations by the war and hoped that would be a lasting result. Alfred Capus wrote in an article published in Figaro, “The Anglo-French alliance is one of the keystones of the system created by our common victory.” He went on to say, “any movement...calculated to harm Franco-British friendship would have been...of a severe wound inflicted on our victory.” The diplomatic debate over the future of Germany already
strained public opinion in France. The British delegates refused to support France’s draconian reparations and territorial demands on Germany.60

The Syrian question furthered this tension. Balfour insisted that the British placate France when it came to Syria.61 If the Syrian question could be settled in France’s favor, it would ease relations leading to a more favorable settlement of the German treaty from a British point of view. Lloyd George explained the situation to Faisal in this way. Britain had made promises to both France and to the Arabs. For the sake of national honor, the British needed to honor both agreements. Britain would not have any influence over Syria.62 However, could Britain keep both of its promises, or did they conflict so much that it would be impossible?

Arthur Balfour attempted to reexamine the situation to find a better solution to the Sykes-Picot agreement. In Balfour’s opinion, even though Sykes claimed that he had resolved the question back in 1916, the British had conflicting interests in the region. He noted that Sykes-Picot created two colonies in the Near East—one French and one British. The creation of colonies to him seemed a complete violation of the new League of Nations covenant and needed to be revised. Between these colonies the treaty called for French and British protectorates over Arab states; however, McMahon had promised the Arabs complete independence. As foreign protection meant following the directives of advisors, even this most indirect form of colonialism still violated McMahon’s promise to Husayn.63 However, complete independence was out of the question for Balfour. The League of Nations had already declared that the former Turkish Empire needed European guidance towards self-government and prescribed “mandates” to European powers who would “nurture” these areas until they could govern themselves.64 Balfour also noted that as much as the British claimed to agree with the principle of self-determination, it could not be applied in the Near East. After all, Woodrow Wilson and the Americans had refused to take a mandate in the Near East, and Lloyd George had rejected a mandate in Syria. This left France as the only option. The local population would have no choice in the matter. Balfour’s solution, therefore, was simply to update Sykes-Picot so that it looked less imperialistic. Neither power would have areas of direct control unlike the terms of Sykes-Picot. He proposed three mandates—Syria for France and both Mesopotamia and Palestine for Britain. These mandates would all be governed like the areas of influence that Sykes-Picot had proposed.65 Under this plan Syria included Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, and the Mediterranean coast.66 This solution would come to constitute the final successor to the Ottoman Empire. While eliminating the most blatant forms of imperialism, it still placed Syria under French control in violation of local opinion and ignored McMahon’s promise of complete independence to Husayn.

This was far from what Husayn or Faisal had expected. Faisal maintained that contrary to European prejudices, the Arab people were ready for self-government.67 This independence had to be absolute; European protection was still not enough freedom. Faisal protested that “…partitioning under different Mandates…is nothing but the disintegration of the Arab people
and the dismemberment of its country." Faisal envisioned a confederation of three Arab states in the Near East—El-Hedjaz, ruled by his father; El-Irak, ruled by his brother; and Syria, ruled by himself. Thus, the Hashemite clan would provide dynastic unity for the Arab people. British and French zones of influence had no place in this vision. Faisal made it clear to the British that their current arrangement under Balfour would negate the Weizmann-Faisal agreement. He pointed out that the security of the British position in Palestine depended on the cooperation of the Arab state in Syria. Even more threateningly, he warned that all Muslims would oppose any European plan that placed the Islamic Holy Places under the control of a foreign power by force. Not only would Balfour’s plan thus invalidate the Weizmann-Faisal agreement, it would also undermine the possibility of any peaceful situation between the Arabs and European powers.

Faisal’s warnings went unheeded. As Arab resentment at impending French rule mounted, violence in cities along Syria’s coast escalated. At this time, Britain still provided the military needed to maintain order, but Parliament was reluctant to send any additional money into a region that would never be British. Under these conditions, the only permissible solution from their perspective was to withdraw all British forces and turn the task of restoring order over to the French. Thus, in accordance to their repeated promises to France, the British withdrew their army from Syria in September 1919. France now officially had its mandate over Syria, and Faisal was now officially without his independent Arab state.

In theory, the French considered Faisal the official head of state of mandatory Syria; however, his loyalty to France was nonexistent. Now deprived of British support, Faisal relied on the conservative Muslim elements in Syria to support his opposition to French guidance. These conservatives spoke out most strongly against the Zionist cause. Faisal’s greatest challenge in the post-war years was maintaining a balance between moderates like himself and the extremists upon whom support for his regime relied. Even if Faisal had not amended the Weizmann-Faisal agreement to be conditional on Arab independence, the politics of post-war Syria created by the French mandate would have prevented Faisal from being able to fulfill his obligations even if he had been so inclined. The Zionists would now receive no support from an Arab state in Syria.

Facing a lack of Arab support meant that a one-state solution was impossible. The charter establishing mandatory Palestine, dated December 1919, recognized that reality. The British and Zionists who wrote the charter never consulted the Arabs. Unlike the Weizmann-Faisal agreement, the charter explicitly stated that Palestine was reserved for a “Jewish national homeland (Erez Israel).” Though the charter made certain provisions for the local population, there was no doubt that this was a Jewish state. For instance, the charter promised the protection of local land rights as well as religious toleration, but the charter also made Jewish religious festivals state holidays, promised a governing assembly specifically of Zionist officials, and failed to specify who would control the Islamic Holy Places. Even worse from an Arab
viewpoint, there were no pretensions of the new Palestine being an independent
nation. The charter clearly designated Palestine as a British mandate under the
League of Nations. Under the conditions of this charter, it is exceedingly
clear that for the native Palestinian population to have the civil rights promised
by the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement, a separate Palestinian state would be
necessary. This charter left no chance for a multi-ethnic state to exist
peacefully. From that point on, the two-state solution was the only practical
political alternative.

British wartime policy greatly hindered the peace settlement
following World War I in the Near East. The failure of the Arab Bureau to
create a unified foreign policy in the Near East left the door open for civil
servants to make conflicting promises to Britain’s allies. The Ottoman Turk’s
ability to resist the British attack early in the war drove the British to search for
allies. At the time winning the war was far more important than evaluating the
consequences of these promises for the post-war world. The Weizmann-Faisal
Agreement arose out the necessity of the Arab and Zionist leaders to reconcile
the conflicting promises that the British had made to them. They feared that
without close cooperation the British would sacrifice both of their causes in
order to fulfill their obligations to France. For this reason, the agreement called
for the one-state solution. In the end, however, only the British promises to the
Arabs contradicted those made to the French. The obligations made to France
took precedence over those made to the Arabs due to the need to reconcile
relations with France. Without this reconciliation, Britain could not have been
able to get French support for a moderate peace plan with Germany or continue
their alliance into the post-war world; however, the consequences of honoring
them were equally high. Faisal never received the independent state that
McMahon promised his father in 1915. The success of the Weizmann-Faisal
agreement was conditional on this fact; without it, the agreement was void.
The end of the Weizmann-Faisal Agreement meant the loss of Arab support for
Jewish settlement in Palestine. This support was necessary for the one-state
solution to be successful.

Ninety-three years later, the Palestinian question remains unanswered.
Without the one-state solution, the only apparent answer to the question is for
separate Jewish and Palestinian states. This is the political reality of today. It is
extremely intriguing to consider how differently the situation could have been
had the British honored their agreements with the Hashemite clan.
Works Cited


Notes

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