A Door to Opportunity?  
Comparing Program Design and Outcomes of Three Residential Mobility Policies in the U.S.

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This article examines the Gautreaux, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), and Gautreaux II housing mobility programs to answer the question, “Why did seemingly similar programs have different results?” While the original Gautreaux program resulted in improved education and employment outcomes for participants, MTO resulted in null findings, which have likewise been found or are predicted for Gautreaux II. This study uses a framework of “neighborhood treatments” and retention of treatments to investigate this discrepancy. I find that background conditions, such as the supply and location of affordable housing, barriers to searching for units, and discrimination to participants, resulted in weaker neighborhood “treatments” and retention of treatments in the MTO and Gautreaux II programs than in the original Gautreaux program. The article also finds that the Gautreaux uniquely took extensive measures through its program design to intervene in these background conditions. As such, the article concludes that MTO and Gautreaux II cannot be seen as genuine tests of neighborhood effects and that further testing of these effects is needed.

Arthur Brooks, president of the conservative think-tank, American Enterprise Institute, recently wrote in an editorial: “If you are like most Americans, you believe we all should start at more or less the same place with more or less the same opportunities to succeed in life” (2010). Though Brooks may be correct in asserting that “most Americans” believe these notions of equality of opportunity, America’s neighborhoods ensure just the opposite. Far more than in other countries (Briggs 2005), neighborhoods in the U.S. are segregated by class and color (Charles 2005) and affect one’s life chances (Squires and Kubrin 2006; Wilson 1987). This “geography of opportunity” (Briggs 2005) benefits residents of high-resource neighborhoods, while areas of concentrated poverty act as traps for individuals of lower socio-economic status (Jargowsky 2002; Briggs 2001).
Segregated, isolated neighborhoods function like “separate societies” (Boger 1996) and exert neighborhood “concentration effects” (Wilson 1987) on residents. In areas of concentrated poverty, these effects include high teenage-childbearing and high-school drop-out rates (Crane 1991), as well as increased odds for residents to engage in delinquency and substance abuse, often due to the lack of role models (Wilson 1987). Living in high-poverty areas also has negative associations with safety, health, and employment (Pashup et. al 2005). Through these neighborhood effects, the concentration of poverty itself predisposes future generations to such neighborhoods.

Conversely, affluent neighborhoods also have “neighborhood effects” of their own (Boyd 2008), such as role models, institutions and systems that foster success in education and mainstream employment. For one, children growing up in middle-class or affluent neighborhoods are more likely to attend better schools, graduate from high school, and attend college (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). By contrast, inner-city children who “escape the projects” and achieve these same ends are viewed as “minor miracles” (Jargowsky 2002, 64). The advantages of middle-class children extend beyond their socio-economic background and upbringing, however, to the resources of the neighborhoods in which the children grow up, such as the schools they attend. Indeed, the neighborhood effects of schools are particularly strong in the U.S. because of the system of location-based districting; seven out of ten children who attend public school are assigned their school based on where they live (Heise and Ryan 2001). Therefore, in the United States, residential segregation becomes school segregation: the average white student attends a school that is 81.2 percent white, while nearly seventy percent of black and seventy-five percent of Hispanic students attend schools that are fifty to one-hundred percent minority (Heise and Ryan 2001). CIlass is also replicated in school segregation; schools in high poverty areas typically have fewer resources, putting disadvantaged children, who come to school with fewer resources from home, in “double jeopardy” (Puma et al. 2000). In contrast, districts with good schools often market their schools as commodities of a location, thus pricing out poorer families with fewer resources.

For some, such concentration effects are the product of middle-class individuals working hard for their place “one notch up on the residential ladder,” and others should also have to “make it” to obtain such goods (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997, 231). This view, however, depends on the assumption that all those who can afford to move up the housing ladder can, in fact, do so. In fact, the nation exhibits “dual housing markets” for people of different races (Squires 2002). Even after controlling for family composition and socioeconomic resources, black families are less likely to live in high-opportunity neighborhoods than white families (Alba and Logan 1993; Rosenbaum et al. 1991). For example, Logan (2003) found that the average black family earning $60,000 a year lived in a neighborhood with a higher poverty rate than a white family earning $30,000 a year.

The other side of this discriminatory housing market is reflected in the racial composition of poor neighborhoods. The black poor are far more likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty than white families of similar socio-
economic status (Massey and Denton 1993; Briggs 2005). For example, the poor black population living in areas of extreme poverty increased by 164 percent between 1970 and 1980, but only by twenty-four percent for poor whites (Curley 2005; Wilson 1987). There are certainly poor whites in America, but many live in mixed-income areas, including suburbs, where families are within closer reach of good schools and employment (Dreier and Moberg 1995). As Richard Thompson Ford points out, ghetto neighborhoods were created because discriminatory laws, real estate agents, and landlords confined blacks to these areas (2008). Though often more subtle, discrimination in the housing market continues today based on characteristics such as having a “black” name or “black” dialect (Massey and Lundy 2001). Thus, though the market system contributes to the current patterns of housing and race, segregation does not exist in a fair market.

Although housing policies appear to be an important route to changing such patterns, the traditional approach to housing policy has aggravated residential segregation. Government public housing projects (“projects”) were built in the worst neighborhoods of inner-cities (Goering 2005), where neighborhoods already suffered from the effects of concentrated poverty. Although these projects began as temporary safe havens for the working poor, they evolved into “long-term homes for the poor” with high crime rates, low health standards, and drug abuse (Jenks and Mayers 1990). As a result, some have argued that the reality of these projects diverged significantly from the “decent home and a suitable living environment” pledged by the American Housing Act of 1949 (Newman and Schnare 1997).

**Changing Addresses, Changing Opportunities: The Example of Gautreaux**

A class-action lawsuit begun in 1969, however, sought to change that. The case, brought by Dorothy Gautreaux, a black community activist and public housing resident, and Alexander Polikoff, an ACLU lawyer, was filed on behalf of 40,000 African-American families in Chicago public housing. Polikoff and Gautreaux argued that the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) had located its buildings and assigned its tenants on a racially segregated basis (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). After a lengthy legal process, the case, *Hills v. Gautreaux* (1976) went to the Supreme Court, which found the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), guilty of not complying with the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Roisman 2007). The case was settled on a “consent decree,” or a program directive for CHA and HUD. The decree stated that rather than build new housing for black public housing residents, HUD must place families in communities no more than thirty percent black. HUD and the Chicago Housing Authority partnered with a nonprofit housing group, the Leadership Council, to run the program. By the program’s conclusion in the late 1990s, 7,100 black families had successfully moved through the program to predominately white, suburban neighborhoods (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000).

Results of these moves, assessed several years later by James Rosenbaum and colleagues (1988; 1991; 2000), were a “dramatic confirmation” of the
role of neighborhood effects and the geography of opportunity on educational, employment, and behavioral outcomes (Duncan 2007). Results showed that parents placed in affluent suburban communities were significantly more likely to find employment than their city counterparts and have higher earnings (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000; Mendenhall et al. 2006). Additionally, in the most dramatic result of the program, children who moved to the suburbs made “striking educational gains” (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010, 137), with improvement in graduation rates, placement in a college track while in high school, and attendance at four-year colleges (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000), summarized in Table 1.

These positive results of Gautreaux impressed scholars and policymakers alike. In 1992, HUD launched the $70 million Moving to Opportunity (MTO) social experiment aimed to test neighborhoods as “levers” for opportunity (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2001). The program sought to improve participants’ education and employment (Orr et al. 2003) by moving residents of public housing into low-poverty neighborhoods. Unlike Gautreaux, the program focused only on the poverty rate of these destination neighborhoods, not racial composition. It required participants in the experimental group to move to census tracts with no more than ten percent of residents below the poverty rate. The program was administered between 1994 and 1998 in five metropolitan areas: New York, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Chicago, and Boston.

In addition to MTO, several other similar policies, dubbed “residential mobility programs,” (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010; Pashup et al. 2005) were created in the model of Gautreaux, often through desegregation cases such as Young v. Pierce in East Texas (1995) and Hollman v. Cisneros in Minneapolis (Popkin et al. 2003). Additionally, in 2001, the Chicago Housing Authority authorized a new round of the Gautreaux residential mobility program for public housing residents in response to continuing litigation (Pashup et al. 2005). Known as “Gautreaux II,” this program imposed race and poverty rate restrictions on census tracts, which could be no more than thirty percent black and have at most twenty-four percent of residents below the poverty rate (Pashup et al. 2005).

However, despite being created in the spirit of Gautreaux I (as I will refer to the original Gautreaux program), both the MTO and Gautreaux II programs failed to meet the promise of this initial program. In education, MTO showed no effects in either schooling or employment. Likewise, data available for Gautreaux II, though more recent, suggests a similar lack of change: more than half of the participants of the program moved on from these addresses after the first year of housing, substantially minimizing the effects of being placed in a new neighborhood (Duncan 2007). The differences between the program outcomes in employment and education for program participants and their children are illustrated in Table 2.

As can be seen, a discrepancy arises between the results of Gautreaux I in education and employment and the results of MTO and expected or available outcomes of Gautreaux II. But why did seemingly similar programs have different results? One answer considers Gautreaux I an anomaly and discounts neigh-
another response claims public housing residents do not wish to move, and so will return to origin neighborhoods shortly after their initial relocation. In this article, I counter such hypotheses and examine the conditions in which programs operated and how the programs intervened—or failed to intervene—in these conditions. I argue Gautreaux I uniquely took measures to control and change its context. In contrast, MTO and Gautreaux II depended on the conditions of the existing private housing market. However, for MTO and Gautreaux II, this decision backfired: the supply conditions left participants with “little room to maneuver” (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008) in the housing market, regardless of preferences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>City Group (“Control”)</th>
<th>Suburb Group (“Experimental”)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dropped out of school</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>&lt;5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College track</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend college</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Rosenbaum and Rubenowitz 2000.

Table 2.
Divergent outcomes in Gautreaux I, Moving to Opportunity and Gautreaux II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gautreaux I</th>
<th>Moving to Opportunity</th>
<th>Gautreaux II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Education</td>
<td>Suburban movers were more likely to be (1) in high school, (2) in a college track (3) in a four-year college. Grades stayed the same, even with more rigorous standards.</td>
<td>No improvement in math or reading test scores.</td>
<td>Unlikely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent’s Employment</td>
<td>More likely to hold a job, less dependent on welfare.</td>
<td>No effects.</td>
<td>Little effect.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Introduction to Key Terms

In this article, I seek to answer the following question: why did Gautreaux I yield benefits for movers in employment and education that MTO and Gautreaux II failed to replicate? I focus on the “neighborhood change treatment” (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2001) for each of these social programs, defined as the characteristics of the places where participants moved. I hypothesize that differences in the “neighborhood treatment” and retention of the treatment affected the program outcomes, or the dependent variables in this article. In particular, I define these dependent variables as: (a) improvements in children’s education achievement and (b) gains in parents’ employment. I also argue that the treatment itself and retention of this treatment is affected by “antecedent” or “background conditions” (Van Evera 1997: 53). In some cases, program interventions can also shape the conditions in which programs occur, as Figure 1 illustrates. I begin by examining the neighborhood treatments of program participants, as well as examining the antecedent conditions and interventions that shaped these neighborhood treatments.

Treatment Condition: Neighborhood Outcomes

I argue that in housing mobility programs, improvement in the educational and employment measures is first and foremost a product of neighborhood outcomes or where participants relocate. In analyzing these neighborhood outcomes, I examine three factors: (1) whether or not participants were able to move (“lease up”), (2) the distance of this neighborhood from the original neighborhood, and (3) how the neighborhood differs in racial and socio-economic characteristics from the original neighborhood, or what I will call “social distance.” In comparing neighborhood outcomes of the three programs, I find substantial differences between the placement neighborhoods of Gautreaux I, MTO and Gautreaux II, as illustrated in Table 3.

Although I separate spatial and social “distances” for the purposes of discussion (see Table 3), it is key to note that such factors are often one and the same. For example, in Orfield’s analysis of the tax capacity of suburbs (2001),
Table 3.
Differences in neighborhood outcomes for suburban movers/program participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gautreaux I</th>
<th>Moving to Opportunity</th>
<th>Gautreaux II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Participants Leasing Up within Program Guidelines</strong></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Spatial Distance**
- **Average Distance Moved**: 25 miles
- **Average of less than 10 miles**: Chicago city limits and nearby suburbs.

**Percent of Mover Participants Moving Less than 10 Miles**
- **10%**
- **84%**
- **Data not available**

**Social “Distance”**
- **Average Percent Minority in New Neighborhood**: ~10%
- **75% of all MTO participants in >60% minority (“segregated”) neighborhoods.**
- **< 30% black + avg. 24% Latino in Reed et al. 2005 sample.**

- **Average Poverty Rate in New Neighborhood**: 5.3%
- **10.8%**
- **13% in Boyd et al. sample**

those spatially closer to the city are also most economically at-risk. In Gautreaux I, as Table 3 demonstrates, placement locations were very different from the origin neighborhoods of participants (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). For these low-income black individuals, the “distant white suburbs” of Lake and DuPage counties were “foreign lands” (Polikoff 2006, 221) in both demographics and their literal locations. The latter two programs, however, resulted in “weaker treatments” (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006, 683) for program participants; placement neighborhoods failed to contrast in kind (Sampson 2008) from origin neighborhoods (see Table 3).

**Social Distances**

Social distances are the central factor of comparative neighborhood outcomes (Keels et al. 2005). Gautreaux I moved experimental families, as Table 3 shows, into affluent communities with an average of a 5.3 percent poverty rate, where program participants became “strangers in a strange land” (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000), most of which were greater than ninety percent white (Rosenbaum and DeLuca 2001). In MTO, by contrast, compliers largely moved from and to segregated black neighborhoods; the comparison was one more of “segregated poor” to “segregated nonpoor” neighborhoods than the Gautreaux I study of “segregated poor” to “integrated nonpoor” (Massey and Clampet-Lundquist 2008). For three-fourths of the MTO experimental group, destination addresses were in areas that were over sixty percent black (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010), a sharp contrast to the thirty percent ceiling set by Gautreaux I and II for all participants. Second, the neighborhood improvements of the MTO group did not involve moves to “truly affluent neighborhoods,” but to “less impoverished” neighborhoods (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006). In other words, although MTO experimental families experienced a decrease in the poverty rates of their neighborhoods, per program guidelines, they did not necessarily move to affluent neighborhoods markedly different from their origin neighborhoods (Sampson 2008). This fact is related to the racial segregation of MTO tracts: racially segregated areas, even nonpoor areas, are likely to be embedded in a larger area of poverty, and, therefore, spatially disadvantaged (Sampson 2008; Patillo-McCoy 1999). Particularly in the Chicago and Baltimore cases of MTO, due to the history of racism and segregation, the average “segregated black” neighborhood is not comparable socially or economically to the nonpoor neighborhoods inhabited by other groups (Massey and Clampet-Lundquist 2008).

In Gautreaux II, although the program imposed the race requirement of the original Gautreaux I program (less than thirty percent black), this failed to ensure that participants moved to majority white neighborhoods as in Gautreaux I. Rather, due to the changing demographics of the Chicago area, particularly an increase in Latino population, participants moved to areas with a substantial (twenty-four percent) Latino/Hispanic population (Reed et al. 2005, 226). The lower threshold on poverty rate (twenty-three percent versus MTO’s ten percent) combined with this flexibility of the racial requirement in practice may have contributed to a weaker treatment condition when participants were able to lease up.
Spatial Distances

We also find differences in the literal, physical distance of neighborhood outcomes of participants in the three studies, which itself—indeed of social characteristics of a neighborhood—factors into program outcomes. Such proximity was present in both MTO and Gautreaux II: MTO participants moved an average of ten miles away (Gautreaux at Forty 2006), while over half of Gautreaux II participants never left the city limits of Chicago (Snyderman 2003). With these short distance treatments, MTO and Gautreaux II continued to offer mover children “ample opportunities” (DeLuca et al. 2010: 18) for participation in delinquent activities or old peer groups (Popkin, Leventhal and Weismann 2010). By contrast, Gautreaux participants were placed an average of thirty miles and at minimum a thirty minute drive away from origin neighborhoods, and in some cases placements were an hour-and-a-half drive from inner-city Chicago (Rosenbaum 1994). Comparative maps of placement locations in the three programs illustrate these spatial differences (see Figures a-c on pp. 44-45). Thus, while studies have not yet tested the effects of spatial distance without social distance, breaking free of dysfunctional peer effects through spatial distance appears to have contributed to the Gautreaux I children’s success.

Explaining Lease-Ups and Spatial and Social Distances: Program Guidelines

One way to explain differences in neighborhood outcomes is through program guidelines or where participants were allowed to move with their vouchers in each program (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). Each program outlined different criteria of census tracts that constituted “opportunity” neighborhoods for participants, summarized in Table 4. These guidelines, in turn, determined the social and spatial distances of the tracts where participants relocated, as well as the rates of participants who successfully secured housing with their vouchers. We see a clear correlation between the social distance neighborhood outcomes of the program participants and the requirements set by the programs described in Table 4. In MTO, for example, the program instituted only poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poverty Guideline for New Neighborhood</th>
<th>Gautreaux I</th>
<th>Moving to Opportunity</th>
<th>Gautreaux II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No guideline.</td>
<td>Less than 10% poverty rate in the 1990 Census.</td>
<td>Less than 24% poverty rate.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Guideline for New Neighborhood</td>
<td>Less than 30% black.</td>
<td>No guideline.</td>
<td>Less than 30% black.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Differences in program guidelines across Gautreaux I, MTO and Gautreaux II.

Sources: Keels 2005 et al.; Sanbonmatsu et al.2006; Pashup et al. 2005.
Figure a. Gautreaux I Origin and Destinations, (blue and yellow dots, respectively).
Source: DeLuca and Rosenblatt 2008.

Figure b. Chicago MTO
Source: Author, using data from Snyderman 2003.
rate criteria in defining destination neighborhoods. Absent racial guidelines, participants stayed in segregated neighborhoods, with three-quarters of destination addresses in areas that were over sixty percent black (Briggs, Popkin and Goe-rring 2010).

Yet, when program guidelines are brought more in line with Gautreaux I, and include the criteria for race, we find a paradox: in requiring this “stronger treatment,” many participants will find it impossible to lease up at all. While it “may seem surprising that not all families that can move through these programs choose to do so” (Pashup et. al 2005, 362), contextual barriers often prove insurmountable. In Gautreaux II, participants were initially told they had 180 days from the date of their orientation to move using their voucher. After most participants still had not found new housing that met program requirements, the 180-day requirement was waived, but even eighteen months afterward some residents continued to search and a majority failed to lease up (Pashup et al. 2005). MTO
participants faced similar obstacles, with only forty-seven percent of voucherholders successfully leasing up in low-poverty neighborhoods. How, then, was Gautreaux I able to get around these obstacles and provide both high lease-up rates and a “strong treatment” that resulted in social distances in both race and class? To understand this puzzle, we must evaluate the antecedent barriers faced by residential mobility programs and the interventions taken by the Gautreaux program.

Explaining Neighborhood Outcomes: Antecedent Barriers and Interventions

Location and Supply of Affordable Housing

Programmatic elements interact with their context, the first of which is the supply of affordable housing in “opportunity” neighborhoods, which was a challenge for all three programs (Polikoff 2006; Briggs et al 2010; Pashup et. al 2005). The supply of affordable rental housing is a barrier for residential mobility policies more widely. For example, in Minneapolis, see Goetz (2003) and in New York and Dallas, see Popkin et al. (2003). Nationally, the supply of affordable housing is also shrinking (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010), and when low-cost housing is available, it is concentrated in older central cities and declining or unstable inner-core suburbs (Millennial Housing Commission 2002) typically outside the bounds of program guidelines. In the early years of the Gautreaux program, however, the program worked in the space of a “relatively loose market” (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008: 23), which bolstered the supply of affordable housing available, particularly in developing suburbs (Popkin 2006). In contrast, MTO participants nationwide saw a tightening of the supply of affordable housing during the period of their vouchers. To understand this shortage of available affordable housing, vacancy rates prove useful. The vacancy rates in Greater Boston, New York, and Los Angeles became “extremely tight” (less than three-four percent) during the MTO period, below the six percent vacancy rate considered “healthy” for rental prices and turnover (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008: 26). The general supply of affordable housing also decreased during the 1990s, with 1.2 million low-rent units (less than $400/month including utilities) lost between 1993 and 2003 (Harvard Center for Joint Housing Studies 2006). Thus, even with counselor intervention, as Thompson (2006) shows in Chicago, programs may remain paralyzed by supply conditions.

A lack of affordable housing supply was also a problem for Gautreaux II, particularly given the program’s race and class requirements. During the early 2000’s, the lease-up rate for voucher-holders with no moving restrictions (i.e. regular Section 8) was eighteen percentage points lower than the lease-up rate in the early 1990s, when the market was already tight (Finkel and Buron 2001; Kennedy and Finkel 1994; Pashup et al. 2005). Furthermore, in Chicago during this time, affordable housing was available primarily in “a handful of racially segregated neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty” (Snyderman
Thus, the lack of successful lease-ups of Gautreaux II reflects both the supply climate and restrictions due to program guidelines.

However, unlike MTO and Gautreaux II, Gautreaux I did not have to depend on the supply of affordable housing provided by the market. The Leadership Council intervened in both the supply side and demand side of the affordable housing equation, and thus was able to change the terrain of affordable housing. During the Gautreaux I program, HUD contracted with the Illinois Housing Development Authority to make incentives available for developers who built housing specifically for Gautreaux participants (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000, 25). These incentives came in the form of low-interest loans for developers if they accepted plaintiff-class families as tenants (Polikoff 2006). Through these negotiations with developers, the Gautreaux program was able to literally create the supply of affordable housing in opportunity areas, a necessary component for successful residential mobility programs (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010, 226).

Additionally, in mobility programs, the price of housing vouchers plays a “critical role” in determining the units available for program participants in desirable neighborhoods (Turner and Williams, 1998: 116). Housing mobility programs typically use Fair Market Rent limits (FMR), but again Gautreaux I differs from MTO and Gautreaux II. Although Gautreaux I began by using FMRs to determine voucher levels, the program soon was able to exceed these limits (Polikoff 2006). When the Leadership Council found the voucher levels to be unsatisfactory, the Council appealed to HUD for higher rent levels and increased subsidies. Their request was granted by the Carter administration, which allowed increases of up to twenty percent for securing units in Cook and DuPage counties, outer-lying (and more expensive) suburban areas of the region. In contrast, MTO and Gautreaux II were bound to the FMR guidelines without the exemptions granted in Gautreaux I. Moreover, in Gautreaux II the CHA imposed strict space requirements on large families that made using vouchers difficult: each person over eighteen, except for married couples, was required to have a separate bedroom. This meant that for roughly twenty percent of the respondents in the study conducted by Pashup and colleagues (2005), a housing unit would require four or more bedrooms. Such properties were typically above the fair market rent voucher value—unless the units were not located in opportunity areas. As such, Pashup and her colleagues deem it “hardly surprising” that only a handful of such families were able to lease up and move (Pashup et al. 2005: 380). Unfortunately for these families and all program participants stymied by antecedent factors, moving is a necessary component of neighborhood change treatments and potential changes in education or employment.

Landlord Discrimination—and Overcoming It

Though supply interventions were important, even an adequate supply of affordable housing in opportunity neighborhoods is meaningless if landlords in these areas refuse to rent to voucher-holders and program participants. Discrimination by landlords against program participants was one of the clearest
ways the supply of housing available to movers was limited in Gautreaux II and MTO, though seemingly one of the easiest to address through existing laws against discrimination (Pashup et al. 2006). In this regard, Gautreaux I provided another crucial intervention: the program was unit-based rather than voucher-based. The Leadership Council matched participants with exact addresses that staff members had previously located, negotiated, and secured, rather than giving families vouchers to use in census tracts that met program guidelines (Polikoff 2006).

Indeed, discrimination is one of the most intractable problems of housing mobility programs (Sterken 2009). Though the federal Fair Housing Act has explicitly prohibited discrimination in housing based on “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin” since 1968, (Department of Housing and Urban Development) such laws have not been sufficient to counter all instances of discrimination in housing. Discrimination is difficult to prove in tight markets (Massey and Lundy 2001), and often, victims do not realize instances of discrimination when they occur (Thompson 2006). Additionally, much of contemporary discrimination is more indirect (Ross and Yinger 2005).

For example, based on status as a voucher-holder. This “source-of-income discrimination” (Pashup et al. 2005: 375) presents a challenging paradox for voucher-based mobility policies: it is likely to increase as units become more desirable. For example, in Gautreaux II, landlords denied participants units because of prior “bad experiences with Section 8 tenants” (Pashup et al. 2005: 376) or concerns about the bureaucracy involved with voucher-holders (Sterken 2009). Although source-of-income discrimination is illegal in the city of Chicago (Pashup et al. 2005: 375), few Chicago suburbs have similar laws, creating further obstacles for participants of Gautreaux II to make moves like those of Gautreaux I.

In light of these barriers to housing, the Gautreaux I program’s intervention of providing real estate staff to set up program participants with exact addresses cannot be underestimated. Through this practice of prescribing destinations (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010), the Leadership Council was able to secure properties for movers that might have been denied to participants because of discrimination. The Leadership Council used a variety of strategies to overcome these landlord-related obstacles. In negotiating units, the Leadership Council assured landlords and developers that counseled families would be good tenants and that the Council would offer help with any post-move problems. These words “provided some comfort” to the developers and landlords otherwise anxious about renting to black, inner-city, public housing families (Polikoff 2006). Additionally, the Council hired a public relations firm to prepare materials for landlords (Polikoff 2006) as well as a white, “seasoned” real-estate professional who had run a housing agency. This professional, Mary Messer, personally visited landlords, took them the program’s brochures, and gained their support, leading to units for participants (Polikoff 2006, 233). The Leadership Council also used its board members, outside real estate experts, and fair housing agencies to engage housing providers in the program (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). Finally, in cases where landlords refused to participate, this resistance was directed towards counselors before participants were assigned units. In contrast, in
MTO and Gautreaux II, participants would have conducted these negotiations and received the discrimination (Pashup et al. 2005). Thus, through these various means of intervening with landlords, the Gautreaux I program was able to expand the supply of affordable housing in high-resource neighborhoods for movers. The unit-based program design of Gautreaux I was also a critical intervention into other antecedent conditions.

*The Search Itself as a Barrier*

The time and labor of searching for a unit that both complied with program guidelines and could be secured by a voucher was another barrier to lease-up for many participants. The extent of this difficulty of the search is made clear by Gautreaux II outcomes: of the participants who did not lease up, seventy-three percent had actively engaged in a housing search at some point (Pashup et al. 2005). Of participants who did effectively move in the Gautreaux II program, most had spent at least three months conducting their housing search (Pashup et al. 2005). For some participants, employment or educational commitments restricted their time to engage in an intensive search (Pashup et al. 2005). By assigning participants units, Leadership Council helped save families’ time and money in a way not offered to the MTO or Gautreaux II movers. Gautreaux I movers, by contrast, did not have to conduct a search on their own unless they chose to seek out their own units. Though both programs had counseling services, these services had a “very weak implementation” (Boyd et al. 2010: 142) in Gautreaux II and were not utilized sufficiently in MTO (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010).

For many participants, the search process triggered anxieties about the private housing market. MTO and Gautreaux II participants typically had long family histories in public housing (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010) and lacked exposure to private housing. As a result, participants felt uncomfortable negotiating with landlords and in the private housing market (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). This isolation contrasts with many of the Gautreaux I movers, who were typically the first or second generation of their families in public housing (Mendenhall et al. 2006). Therefore, not only did Gautreaux I provide a program design more conducive to these anxieties about the private market, but cohort differences (Duncan and Zuberi 2006) between the MTO and Gautreaux II populations exacerbated the difficulty of the search for the later groups. Though the program design of self-conducted searches from Gautreaux I was implemented to foster “empowerment,” (Pashup et al. 2005) in the end, the search was often an insurmountable obstacle to leasing up or accessing unfamiliar neighborhoods (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010).

*Information Poverty in the Search*

Additionally, Messner’s real estate experience imparted her searches with knowledge about the Chicago housing market, especially how to find neighborhoods that reconciled the paradox between affordability and opportunity.
Messer’s awareness that the area around O’Hare Airport had a loose market was, for example, one way to increase the Gautreaux I supply. Aside from a lack of real estate knowledge, many participants of housing mobility programs have little knowledge of suburbs outside of the city, thus constricting their search. In Gautreaux I, many participants were placed in towns they had never heard of before (Polikoff 2006). But in both MTO and Gautreaux II, the lack of unit-based design meant that this “information poverty” was a significant barrier to finding affordable units in “opportunity” areas (Pashup et al. 2005; Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). As a result, many MTO participants restricted their searches to areas with which they were familiar (Massey and Clampest-Lundquist 2008; Sampson 2008). In Gautreaux II, when participants “beat the
odds” of leasing up, it was often because they had lived in housing projects on the north side of Chicago in closer proximity to opportunity areas (Pashup et al. 2005). For other participants, however, restricted information (Boyd 2010) likely factored into their difficulty of finding an adequate unit.

Evaluating Barriers and Interventions

From this discussion, it appears strange that planners failed to incorporate the unit-based nature of Gautreaux I into the design of MTO or Gautreaux II, which were both voucher-based programs. One explanation likely comes from Polikoff’s observation that as the Gautreaux program developed, more families decided to find units on their own and were successful in doing so (2006). In the later years of the program, the process of participants finding apartments on their own and persuading landlords to rent to them became an “important feature” of Gautreaux I according to Polikoff (2006, 246). However, although participants in Gautreaux I were able to secure units, I view this as a unique situation: a precedent had already been established by the Gautreaux I counselors earlier in the program, providing a platform for participants to negotiate their units. Participants of later programs lacked this platform: MTO participants were dispersed across the country; Gautreaux II was twenty years after the original program. The success of Gautreaux I, developed in a specific context, gave planners of subsequent programs “too much faith in the power of a voucher subsidy and some relocation counseling” (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010: 85).

Thus, while it appears that the “controversial experiment” has become “an integral part of federal housing policy” (Fischer 2005) and a model for other programs, the aspect of the program that was arguably the key to its success (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008) and one of its most controversial elements (Imbroscio 2004) has not been replicated. As was true for the barrier of the housing search, counselor interventions in MTO and Gautreaux II were substantially weaker interventions than Gautreaux I counselors’ role of choosing the location and securing units for many program participants. In MTO, Briggs and colleagues note that staff members in program sites were overburdened in recommending locations for participants. In Gautreaux II (2005), Pashup and colleagues found that fewer than ten percent of participants of the study’s qualitative sample stated that counselors had aided in their housing decisions.

Leasing Up but not “Going the Distance”

Without the supply- and unit-based interventions of Gautreaux I, participants of MTO and Gautreaux II faced numerous obstacles such as racial discrimination, source-of-income discrimination, information poverty, and shortage of affordable housing in good neighborhoods. They did not have the “pipeline” supply of affordable housing that supply-side interventions made available for Gautreaux I participants, nor placement into specific addresses. How, then, did participants rise above these challenges and secure housing in “opportunity” neighborhoods? The answer: most did not.
Instead, in both MTO and Gautreaux II, participants moved to census tracts that qualified for the program, but in reality failed to provide the resources and opportunities of Gautreaux I neighborhoods. In Gautreaux I, a unit-based program, counselors evaluated the particular towns and neighborhoods of housing units before movers entered units (Polikoff 2006). In MTO and Gautreaux II, proxies based on census tract figures were assumed to lead to neighborhood treatments. However, because of moves to (1) inner-ring suburbs, (2) poor pockets in low-poverty census tracts, and (3) areas with high percentages of non-black minorities, MTO and Gautreaux II participants were able to use their housing vouchers and meet program requirements. Indeed, such neighborhoods provided an important way for program participants to reconcile the apparent paradox of affordability and program requirements for “opportunity” neighborhoods. However, as a result, leasing up and complying with the proxies of MTO and Gautreaux II was not sufficient to produce the “difference in kind” (Sampson 2008) of the Gautreaux I placement neighborhoods. Figure 3 illustrates where these “flaws in proxies” fall within the overall program scheme.

In the sections that follow, I will examine these flaws in the program proxies—lease-ups in inner-ring suburbs, poor pockets within low-poverty tracts, and the presences of non-black minorities—and how they relate to the placement neighborhoods of MTO and Gautreaux II, both of which differed from the affluent, stable suburban placement neighborhoods of Gautreaux I.

A Flaw in MTO’s Plan: The Role of Inner-Ring Suburbs

For movers in MTO, complying with program guidelines did not mean a move to the stereotypical and affluent suburban neighborhood, in contrast to the suburban placement neighborhoods of Gautreaux I. Understanding this requires looking beyond the myth of urban deterioration and suburban prosperity, which “could not be farther from the truth” (Orfield 2002, 33). Instead, suburbs have increasingly diverged from one another (Souther 2005; Orfield 2002; Harris 1999; Briggs 2004) due to the shifting geography of poverty within metropolitan areas (Orfield 2002; Cook and Merchant 2006), in which the poverty of central cities has “spilled over” (Harris 1999; Vicino 2008) into adjacent suburbs. The number of “inner-ring” suburb census tracts with poverty rates over thirty percent grew eighty-nine percent between 1980 and 2000 (Briggs 2005, 28). Suburban poverty and decentralization accelerated during the 1990s, in particular, when the suburban poor population doubled (Jargowsky 2003), particularly worrisome given the overall boom.

Declining inner-ring suburbs face a unique set of circumstances (Orfield and Puentes 2002), in what has been called a “policy blind spot” (Vicino 2008: 573). Such areas are caught between two “stronger forces of place” (Vicino 2008), the central city, with its central business district and certain attractions, and the outer-lying, wealthier suburbs. Indeed, Harris (1999) and Orfield (1996) find that inner-ring or “low” suburbs are disadvantaged even in comparison to central cities. One challenge is strained tax capacity (Orfield 2002), a process that perpetuates itself. Decreased tax capacity leads to declining resources, mak-
ing communities less attractive to capital (Squires 2002). Decline also reduces educational and employment opportunities for residents (Katz and Bradley 1999), which pushes out residents who have options and can leave—thus further segregating metropolitan areas.

Understanding Minority Suburbanization

Importantly, inner-ring suburbs are also where minority suburbanization tends to be concentrated (Orfield 2002). Although the number of black suburbanites has grown “enormously,” it is these inner-ring/at-risk suburbs which have disproportionately high numbers of blacks (Harris 1999; Orfield 2002; Puentes and Warren 2006) and Latinos (Harris 1999). Additionally, blacks are one-third as likely as whites or Asians to settle in advantaged “high suburbs” with plentiful resources and affluent families (Harris 1999: 14).

Therefore, the “large-scale movement of black people into suburbia since 1970” (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997, 214) may not simply be the picture of success as it is often claimed. By contrast, most black suburbanites have settled in older, inner-ring suburbs (Souther 2005) and live “in the shadow of the suburban dream” rather than the dream itself (Wiese 2005, 143). Additionally, many blacks live in largely black suburbs, which occupy a “buffer zone” (Patillo-McCoy 1999) between the central city and farther outlying, majority-white, affluent suburbs. Harris (1999) goes so far as to argue it is unclear if inner-ring or “low” suburbs represent an advancement over living in the central city for blacks and Latinos or simply evidence horizontal mobility. Due to their location within the suburban landscape, blacks who live in suburbs pay higher taxes and experience smaller increases in home value than white suburban dwellers (Harris 1999). Though there are certain black communities that defy this trend, exceptions are relatively few in number (Thompson Ford 2005, 295) and some, such as Prince George’s County in Maryland, have experienced increased numbers of low-income residents (Ross 2010). Thus, inner-ring suburbs have shifted, but not circumvented the geography of opportunity (Briggs 2005: 36).

MTO and Inner-Ring Neighborhoods

Due to the lack of affordable housing options for participants of MTO, many program participants found an ideal solution in inner-ring suburbs, for these areas fit with program guidelines while remaining affordable and accessible with a voucher. However, inner-ring suburbs came to weaken the neighborhood “treatment” in the MTO program (Sampson 2008). In Gautreaux I, by contrast, inner-ring neighborhoods were both less prevalent and specifically avoided by housing counselors. Gautreaux I participants were placed in “thriving middle-class suburban communities,” not suburban areas with sizable poverty rates and segregation (DeLuca et al. 2010). When counselors searched for housing, they ruled out communities that might risk “tipping” through Gautreaux placements (Polikoff 2006). Satellite cities such as Waukegan and Joliet as well as the southern Cook County suburbs were not considered because of their large and grow-
ing black populations (Polikoff 2006) and substantial Section 8 housing (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000).

These south Chicago neighborhoods are textbook examples of inner-ring, at-risk areas, that witness low tax capacity and increasing percentages of non-Asian minorities and students eligible for free lunch between 1992-1997 (Orfield 2002, Maps 1-1 to 1-24) and crucially, were precisely the sorts of areas in which many MTO participants settled. In sum, inner-ring neighborhoods provide the mechanism for understanding the conclusion that although experimental MTO movers were more likely to enter the suburbs than control movers, the two groups exhibited the same degree of overall neighborhood disadvantage (2008).

Enclaves and “Pockets of Poverty”

Furthermore, the Leadership Council worked with local housing agencies to secure integration and avoid enclaves, or small segregated “micro-neighborhoods” (Briggs 1997) within a certain building or block that can exert their own concentration effects (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). In Oak Park, for example, Gautreaux I families were placed on the suburb’s predominately white west side versus its less-expensive east side, where black residents tended to cluster. In contrast, many MTO families negotiated the problem of minimal affordable housing precisely by locating units in such “pockets of poverty” (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2001), areas within census tracts that were otherwise low-poverty and complied with program guidelines. Thus, “suburban Section 8 ghettos” developed (Dreier and Moberg 1995, 2) in “vulnerable, increasingly distressed areas” (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010, 147) where landlords were less likely to discriminate on source of income. These “voucher submarkets” (Engdahl 2009, 1) in new neighborhoods “mirrored the segregation of origin neighborhoods” (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010, 33), even as participants complied with program guidelines. Such suburban pockets of poverty were prevalent in the 1990s given the overall suburban decline, thus creating many opportunities for participants to comply with program guidelines, yet receive different neighborhood treatments from Gautreaux I participants.

The Sprawling of Suburbia: Expanding, Polarizing and Distancing

However, this decline is only part of a regional picture of overall “suburban dichotomy” (Short, Hanlon and Vicino 2007). This “suburban secession” of the most successful residents of cities and inner-ring suburbs (Kruse 2005) to outer-lying areas also contributes to patterns of inner-ring suburbs (Berube and Foreman 2002). Businesses, too, leave inner-ring or central-city locations for lower tax rates and cheaper land in outer-ring “greenfield locations” (Wiewel et al. 2002: 261). The rapid development of the outer suburban rings by each generation (Jargowsky 2002) has been termed the “sprawling out” of suburbia (Squires 2002; Orfield 2002).

During the 1990s, as suburbs declined, the growth of these outer-rings communities accelerated (powell 2002). These areas “pull” those who can leave out of declining areas, further stratifying the metropolitan environment along the
lines of race and class (Jargowsky 2002, 55; Powell 2002; Baum 2000). Whites are over-represented in these outer-ring, affluent suburbs, and the converse is true for non-Asian minorities (Harris 1999). Such patterns are clear in McArdle’s case study of Boston (2003). While the “Route 128 high-tech corridor” on the edge of the city became more job-rich, overwhelmingly white and affluent during the 1990s, the transitional inner-ring suburb communities became poorer and more heavily minority.

Programmatically, this sprawled and segregated metropolitan landscape means that “target neighborhoods”—those that can offer neighborhood effects to the degree of the Gautreaux I placement neighborhoods—are now further away from origin neighborhoods than when Gautreaux I was implemented. As such, these areas are often more difficult for participants to access than for the Gautreaux I generation. In the words of one MTO participant, housing counselors “wanted me to move way far, at least forty-five [minutes] to an hour away from my family. I didn’t want to do that...” (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008, 47). If given a choice—as MTO participants were—many program compliers would prefer not to move long distances (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). Furthermore, even if sprawled-out housing is affordable, for program participants lacking a car, this supply is likely not accessible. Though it may appear a similar problem would have surfaced in Gautreaux I, some participants in “opportunity” suburbs were only a thirty-minute drive from their origin neighborhoods. Furthermore, participants were given a choice: they could participate in the program and move to an outer-lying suburb or decide to leave the program. Crucially, if Gautreaux I participants thought their new neighborhoods were too far away, such participants were no longer part of the Gautreaux program (Polikoff 2006, 235). In MTO or Gautreaux II, these participants would have been the norm of the program (see Table 2).

Though neighborhoods typically exhibit de facto economic segregation, in newly-developed outer-ring suburbs, entire sectors of metropolitan areas are devoted to one type of housing, often explicitly through exclusionary zoning laws (Jargowsky 2002). Such laws, which create artificial supply constraints on developers through land-use controls on minimum house sizes, large lots, and prohibitions on manufactured housing (Schill 2001), are pervasive among outlying suburbs (Altshuler et al. 1999). These conditions create a “chain of exclusion” (Pendall 2000) of racial minority (Powell 2002) and poor families (Helling 2002) from the quickly-growing “sprawled-out” areas. Moreover, suburbs can use “minimum lot sizes rather than race” (Souther 2005, 598) to legally create white homogeneity. Given these exclusionary mechanisms, development in the outer-lying rings is “not random” (Kubrin and Squires 2006), and typically fails to bolster the supply of affordable housing.

Thus, even if participants are willing to move to these far-flung locations, units in new suburbs may not be affordable with a housing voucher, providing program participants few options besides leasing up in inner-ring or declining neighborhoods, as was illustrated in the MTO results.
Table 5. Detailed Survey Data of Residential Racial Preferences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House Preferences</th>
<th># White Respondents</th>
<th>% of All White Respondents</th>
<th># Black Respondents</th>
<th>% of All Black Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All White Houses</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>17.73</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 White Houses</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 White Houses</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 White Houses</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 White Houses</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 White Houses</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 White Houses</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 White Houses</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9.89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 White Houses</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>11.11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 White Houses</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 White Houses</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>8.77</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.34</td>
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<td>3 White Houses</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>60.77</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 White Houses</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 White House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Flaw in the Gautreaux II Plan: Thinking in Black and White

MTO was not the only program in which proxies did not guarantee neighborhoods akin to the strong treatment of Gautreaux I. In Gautreaux I, a racial proxy of black residents instated by the consent decree resulted in “opportunity” neighborhoods for participants. At the time, Chicago was “a black and white city” (Polikoff 2006, 68) with non-black minorities totaling less than two percent of the city’s population in 1970 (Author’s calculations, U.S. Bureaus of the Census 1976, 22). When Gautreaux II launched in 2002, the racial demographics of Chicago had changed significantly, with numerous tracts becoming over ninety percent Latino in the period between 2000 -2010 (New York Times 2010). This finding, along with the unit-based design of Gautreaux I, helps to explain the fact that participants in Gautreaux II leased up in neighborhoods with a greater percentage of minorities than participants in Gautreaux I, despite the thirty percent “ceiling” on percentage of blacks in a census tract in both programs. For example, in the Reed et al. respondent sample, twenty-four percent of the residents in placement census tracts were Latino (2005, 226). Furthermore, the unit-based placements of Gautreaux I allowed housing counselors to closely assess neighborhoods based on their actual conditions, including the presence of non-black minorities or immigrants in a location. But this was only one of the ways the unit versus voucher basis of the programs affected the racial make-up of placement neighborhoods.

Table 6.
Same-Race and Out-Group Racial Preferences of Black and White Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred Race of House</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Total Houses</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average # Houses in 14- House Neighborhood</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Total Houses</td>
<td>30.13%</td>
<td>42.27%</td>
<td>12.80%</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average # Houses in 14- House Neighborhood</td>
<td>3.98</td>
<td>5.58</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Racial-Preference Mismatch and Housing Values

As previously noted, one of the most striking differences between Gautreaux I participants and MTO participants is the racial composition of the destination neighborhoods. Although inner-ring suburbs partially account for this pattern, the racial preferences of both program participants and the general population also plays an important role. In the U.S., blacks and whites have a “racial preferences mismatch” or a difference in willingness to live in neighborhoods of out-group members (Charles 2005; Krysan et al. 2009). Whites tolerate only “token numbers” of blacks (2005), estimated at an average of twenty percent per neighborhood (Krysan et al. 2009), or the percentage of blacks in the U.S. population at large. Blacks, on the other hand, by overwhelming majority, prefer half-white, half-black neighborhoods (Charles 2005). As the percentage of blacks in a neighborhood edges closer to the ideal twenty percent favored by whites, many black individuals feel an “aversion to pioneering” (Krysan et al. 2009, 950) particularly linked to fears of discrimination and intolerance (Charles 2005). As the percentage of blacks increases towards the fifty percent that blacks would prefer, whites typically avoid or move out of such areas (Ellen 2000). These preferences are not new. They did not impact the Gautreaux I program, however, due to the program’s unit-based design. Participants moving to the suburbs were placed in neighborhoods with only token numbers of blacks, meeting whites’ preferences and avoiding the problem of neighborhood transition.

This preference mismatch appears to endure even as American attitudes to neighbors grow more tolerant. To update the research on residential racial
preferences, I analyzed the “neighborhood preference” variables of the 2000 General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS asks participants of their ideal neighborhood and then codes each preferred house by race, with a total of fourteen houses; each house is then coded as a separate variable (NEITH1 through NEIETH14). To analyze the data, I used Excel to tabulate the number of houses ideally black, white, Asian and Hispanic for each of the black or white respondents in the GSS (black N = 174; white N = 981). I then summarized the data for each race’s preferred neighborhood, the results of which are in Table 5.

In this analysis, I find racial preferences are mismatched between blacks and whites, particularly for the plurality of whites who prefer entirely homogenous neighborhoods, compared to the plurality for blacks prefer four or five black houses in a fourteen-house neighborhood. I also find that out-group preferences, illustrated in Table 6, are relatively consistent with past data. However, I do find signs of increasing preference for diversity, particularly when including non-black minorities.

Although whites still prefer the percentage of black houses to remain on average below twenty percent (or three out of fourteen houses), some whites also appear to prefer neighborhoods more diverse in the past, with the ideal percent total houses white averaging only fifty-six percent. Additionally, I find black respondents’ ideal neighborhoods to have a smaller black presence than the fifty-fifty preference expressed in past literature (see Krysan et al. 2009), at 42.47 percent black houses preferred per neighborhood. Yet, the black-white racial mismatch endured in 2000, with whites preferring far fewer blacks per neighborhood (2.22 per fourteen houses) than blacks preferred (5.58) per fourteen houses and black preferring fewer whites (3.98) than whites preferred (7.44).

An important mechanism in these preferences is the “racial proxy hypothesis” which contends that when black and Latino presence reaches a “critical mass,” class-related concerns—such as have poorer schools or increased crime—are triggered for both blacks (Galster et al. 1999) and whites (Krysan et al. 2009; Harris 1997). These beliefs become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010; Ellen 2000): as whites’ demand for an area with a growing minority population decreases, the neighborhood begins to experience a racial “tipping,” resulting in a decrease in housing prices if whites are no longer interested in the area (Orfield 2001).

What does all this mean for mobility programs? Given this divided landscape, voucher-holders, like the population at-large, generally have two choices in neighborhoods: white or minority (Krysan et al. 2009), with few neighborhoods stable between these extremes. Although Thernstrom and Thernstrom are correct in asserting that neighborhoods based on a random distribution of blacks and whites would still not result in this ideal fifty-fifty outcome (1997, 218), neighborhoods would also not yield the homogeneity Figure 3 demonstrates. Here, large sections of the Chicago region have populations that are ninety to one-hundred percent white or ninety to one-hundred percent black.

Furthermore, in analyzing the racial composition of 44,000 census tracts in the 1990 census, Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999) found that only eleven percent of these tracts had black composition between twenty-five and
seventy-five percent, illustrating the lack of existing neighborhoods meeting the fifty-fifty-black-white ideal (Krysan and Farley 2009, 940). Given the “aversion to pioneering” (Krysan et al. 2009, 950) previously mentioned, blacks in housing mobility programs are unlikely to choose to enter predominately white areas if not compelled to by program placements, as was true for the placements of Gautreaux I (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey, 2008). Indeed, even in Gautreaux II, the presence of Latinos in the city meant participants did not have to enter a white neighborhood if they were entering a non-black one (Pashup et al. 2005).

These preferences interact with the lack of affordable housing supply. Given the lack of whites’ demand for such areas, inner-ring or predominately minority neighborhoods are more affordable relative to other neighborhoods (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). These neighborhoods may therefore be some of the few low-poverty areas where participants can use vouchers due to both affordability and weaker racial discrimination. Thus, moving to areas with a higher minority population appears to have been a way to circumvent barriers to leasing up, in addition to allowing participants to avoid having to become “racial pioneers” for MTO, and to a lesser extent, Gautreaux II participants. However, in doing so, participants compromised a key aspect of the Gautreaux I neighborhood treatment: a stable and affluent suburban neighborhood, which, given the role of racial preferences, as well as the history of discrimination in the U.S., typically means differing from origin neighborhoods based on class and race (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008).

Retention of Neighborhood Change Treatments

However, simply getting to a neighborhood does not alone facilitate positive neighborhood effects; retention of the neighborhood treatment is also necessary for the positive effects of place (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008; Boyd et al. 2010). I define this “retention” in two ways: (a) the stability of the family in their initial address or areas similar to these addresses and (b) the neighborhood itself remaining stable regarding its initial characteristics. Regarding the first form of retention, in each of the three programs, participants were required to stay in their destination address for one year; after that point, they could use the voucher for their placement address or elsewhere (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000; Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010; Boyd et al. 2010). Yet, this one-year move alone would not confer the positive effects of place on participants, particularly in children’s schooling, which requires an adjustment period of several years (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). Consistent with the differential program outcomes, the lengths of stay in the placement addresses varied widely: the moves of Gautreaux I participants were far more stable than those of MTO (Briggs 1997) or Gautreaux II participants (Boyd et al. 2010), illustrated in Table 7. Since changes in stability essentially “dilute” the neighborhood-change treatment (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006), understanding the occurrence and mechanics of these stability processes is vital to understanding final program outcomes.

Durability of neighborhood outcomes might be expected to be inverse with spatial and social distance factors due to discomfort, but in a “somewhat
surprising” (Boyd et al. 2010) pattern, the findings counter this idea. In both MTO and Gautreaux II, where most participants did not move to spatially or socially distant locations, participants had high rates of secondary moves. In the sample studied by Boyd and colleagues (2010), fewer than half (forty-eight percent) of participants kept their original addresses after the first year of the Gautreaux II move. Furthermore, secondary moves for participants typically meant returning to highly segregated, high-poverty neighborhoods (Duncan 2007). For example, of the families in Boyd’s sample who made secondary moves, eighty-one percent moved to areas that would not have met initial program guidelines (Boyd 2010, 129). MTO participants had similar lack of stability in placement addresses: the average rate of stay in new addresses was 3.1 years, with twenty-five percent of movers staying at their new addresses for at most 1.3 years (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006). Similarly, Briggs and colleagues find that fifty-six percent of MTO participants moved on within a few years to moderate- to high-poverty tracts (2010). In the four to seven year analysis of MTO, participants were on average in neighborhoods that were eighty-three percent minority (in Chicago, ninety percent), with an average of thirty percent of residents in poverty (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008; Sampson 2008), thus not retaining the MTO treatment.

By contrast, the retention of neighborhood outcomes of Gautreaux I has been argued to be the program’s “most stunning success” (Duncan 2007). Fifteen (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2001) or twenty (Duncan 2007) years after the initial move, the neighborhoods of both Gautreaux I mothers and their children continued to be more integrated and have lower poverty rates than origin neighborhoods. Movers came from eighty-three percent African-American neighborhoods and, twenty years later, are living in neighborhoods that average below fifty percent black, as are their grown children (Keels 2005; Duncan 2007). As previously noted, few neighborhoods are actually half-black and half-white; this average masks moves to both majority-black and majority-white neighborhoods. While some Gautreaux participants certainly may have wanted to return to neighborhoods of co-ethnics, for others, neighborhood preferences changed.

### Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retention of treatment: participants still in neighborhoods that meet program requirements.</th>
<th>Gautreaux I</th>
<th>MTO</th>
<th>Gautreaux II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66% after 15+ years</td>
<td>44% after 4 – 7 years.</td>
<td>Less than 50% after 1 year I Boyd et al. sample.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008; Boyd et al. 2010; Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010.
through new norms and expectations from moving to an area unlike their origin neighborhoods. These preferences also appear to have been transmitted to movers’ children (Rosenbaum et al. 2005). As Table 7 suggests, the more socio-economically, racially, and spatially “distant” the moves, the longer the durability of neighborhood treatments. This triggers another puzzle: why would the most seemingly uncomfortable moves be the most durable? Fortunately, large-scale qualitative projects spearheaded by Rosenbaum (Gautreaux I), Pashup (Gautreaux II) and Briggs, Popkin and Goering (MTO) have elucidated answers to this question, to which I now turn.

Factors in Staying: Neighborhood Responses to Movers

The first of these factors is how “receiving” neighborhoods respond to new movers. The reactions of these neighborhoods in mobility programs have ranged from clear intolerance (Goetz 2003) to inclusive “social capital” (Coleman 1988) and bridging following an adjustment period in the Gautreaux I receiving neighborhoods. Social capital in this context refers to the ability, through social networks, social reciprocity, or norms, for individuals to gain “capabilities they would not have otherwise” (Rosenbaum et al. 2005, 152). Discrimination was initially present against Gautreaux I mothers and their children (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). However, many mothers found that upon complying with neighborhood norms (e.g. not playing loud music), these constraints became liberating. For example, once the self-policing of the community included Gautreaux participants, they could let their children play outside without concerns for their children’s safety (Rosenbaum et al. 2000). The support and safety of the new neighborhoods, particularly in neighborhood policing and help with childcare, became more than interpersonal, but systemic, enabling mothers to make commitments, such as taking jobs, that otherwise would have been difficult (Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Rosenbaum and DeLuca 2001). Acts of charity and personal favors in terms of transportation further supplemented the inclusivity extended towards the Gautreaux I mothers (Rosenbaum et al. 2005).

Gautreaux counselors had helped facilitate this social capital, carefully managing the scale and pace of Gautreaux I, thus lessening neighborhood resistance (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). Additionally, the staff at the Leadership Council were well-acquainted with the local politics of the Chicago area and ruled out neighborhoods they believed would respond negatively to black newcomers from the inner-city, particularly communities with a history of racial tensions like Berwyn and Cicero (Polikoff 2006). Additionally, staying in placement addresses itself eased neighborhood relations; where opposition to Gautreaux I occurred, it largely faded after the first year of the program (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000).

Factors in Moving: The Role of Involuntary Moves

Retention rates often appear to be the result of individual preferences, perhaps due to a desire to move back to same-race neighborhoods. However, in
qualitative interviews with participants of both Gautreaux II and MTO, movers emphasized the importance of having their children live in racially diverse areas or the involuntary reasons they moved from initial addresses (Boyd et al. 2010; Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). Patterns of increasing rents, neighborhood response to movers, and concerns about lack of childcare or transportation emerge as the reasons for secondary moves in both MTO (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010, 158) and Gautreaux II (Boyd et al. 2010, 142) rather than a preference for segregated neighborhoods as such.

Rent Increases

A common reason for secondary moves in both Gautreaux II and MTO was rent increases outside the scope of the housing voucher’s Fair Market Rent limit (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010; Boyd et al. 2010). In MTO, this occurred particularly in the L.A., New York, and Boston housing markets, where the availability of affordable rental housing sharply decreased during the span of the program (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). The case of an MTO mover recounting that her landlords stopped accepting vouchers when the market became “red-hot” (Briggs 2010, 135) is typical of many program participants after their initial moves to low-poverty neighborhoods. This may even be true in cases of seemingly benign neighborhood “revitalization,” which may result in higher land prices and displace low-income renters (Briggs 2004). In Gautreaux II, particularly for compliers who had found housing on the city’s North Side, opportunity areas were “gentrifying quickly” (Pashup et al. 2005, 385).

Neighborhood Response

Particularly in MTO, movers experienced opposition in neighborhoods, a far cry from the social capital Rosenbaum et al. argued was present for the Gautreaux I movers (2005). The combination of the large scale of the MTO program and the moves to inner-ring neighborhoods already in decline led to opposition, most notably in the Baltimore program, where a “debacle” (Polikoff 2006, 382) ensued. Residents of the blue-collar inner-ring neighborhoods Dundalk and Essex, Maryland (Vicino 2000), led a resistance effort against the program (DeWitt 1995). In understanding why this occurred, the role of racial proxies (Harris 1999; Krysan et al. 2009) in addition to racial prejudice likely were contributing factors. As Galster et al. note (1999), neighborhoods often have affordable housing because the neighborhoods themselves are in decline, triggering concerns like “property values decreasing when blacks move in” (Harris 1999). Indeed, in the uproar against MTO, property values were a particular concern of inner-ring residents (DeWitt 1995). The Baltimore program, though a louder objection to MTO than other sites, nevertheless highlights the concerns about social isolation of participants and poor relationships upon entering neighborhoods, particularly if movers do not stay past an adjustment period and enter neighborhoods that are sensitive to decline.
Figure 4. Path diagram of posited relationship between voucher-holders, neighborhood treatment and retention of treatment on dependent variables.
Childcare

In Gautreaux I, social capital was crucial in providing Gautreaux I mothers with childcare according to qualitative evidence from Rosenbaum and colleagues (2005). In MTO and Gautreaux II, however, childcare was often a large factor in motivating secondary moves away from placement neighborhoods (Boyd 2008; Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). In origin neighborhoods, childcare often had been provided by informal networks often of kin (Boyd 2008) and in new neighborhoods participants often struggled to find affordable childcare. Furthermore, and most problematically for program outcomes, participants often reconciled these problems by moving back to their origin neighborhoods, thus diluting the original neighborhood treatment (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006).

Staying Put but “Moving”: Changes in the Neighborhood Treatment Itself

Stability is also threatened when the neighborhood changes “around” families (Quillian 1999), particularly through changes in neighborhood poverty rate or race, which fundamentally alter the neighborhood treatment. In particular, MTO saw neighborhood treatments weakened by the environment changing, thus diluting the initial treatment even without a change of address by participants (Sanbonmatsu et al.2006; Boyd et al. 2010). In reading the data from MTO, we can see a discrepancy between the poverty-rate program guidelines of MTO of less than ten percent and the average for placement neighborhood poverty rates of 10.8% (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). How can this be, given that the program mandated fewer than ten percent of tract residents be in poverty?

The answer comes from the impact of the increasing poverty in inner-ring census tracts and transitional neighborhoods in the 1990s. Specifically, eligibility for destination addresses was based on the address’s 1990 census tract data. By the time the 2000 numbers were tabulated, however, the poverty rates in the neighborhoods were higher on average than in 1990 (Sanbonmatsu et al.2006). Of all movers in MTO who successfully leased up in units that met the ten percent poverty rate requirement, one-third had their census tracts slip to at least a twenty percent poverty rate in the 1990s (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008, 32). Thus, rather than moving to opportunity, compliers who moved to transitional neighborhoods moved to areas that were also moving—to higher poverty rates and higher proportions of minority residents (Briggs et al. 2008b). The decline of these neighborhoods resulted in the observation of one woman that “the ghetto followed me” to her new address (McArdle 2003). Such neighborhood changes also explain why treatment effects of MTO are largest just after assignment and then decline over time (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006, 663): as the treatment progressed, destination addresses increasingly resembled participants’ origin addresses.
Effects of Treatment Condition and Retention on Educational and Employment Outcomes

How, then, do the spatial and social distance and durability of neighborhood outcomes contribute to the dependent variables of education and employment? Figure 4 provides an illustration of the relationship between program participants, independent variables, and the dependent variables of educational and employment outcomes, on which I will now focus. Program participants were affected by antecedent conditions in leasing up and neighborhood treatments. In Gautreaux I, program interventions allowed participants to overcome many of these obstacles and move to units in a strong neighborhood treatment. In MTO and Gautreaux II, barriers obstructed obtaining this same treatment condition and/or retention of the treatment.

Educational Outcomes

As noted in the introduction of this article, Gautreaux I children exhibited impressive gains in education (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010) and these results inspired future mobility policies (Polikoff 2006). However, this dream of improving education has not been realized by MTO (Orr et al. 2003) and is doubtful for Gautreaux II (Pashup et al. 2005). To understand these outcomes, in this section, I build on the differences in spatial and social distances of treatments and treatment retention I argued divided Gautreaux I from MTO and Gautreaux II.

Students’ educational outcomes are related to differences in public school quality, which is linked to the spatial and social distance of neighborhoods from inner-city origin locations (Galster et al. 2000). The quality of a school relates to the academic expectations, presence of positive role models and peers that students will find in the school, as well as attitudes and behaviors that discourage violent behavior or drug use, all of which have been shown to be crucial mechanisms of neighborhood-based educational improvement (Schwartz 2010). Thus, the first impact of weak neighborhood-change treatments (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006) is minimal change in schools or school quality for mover children. Although MTO families did move into lower-poverty tracts per program requirements, most did not move into communities with substantially better schools (Briggs et al. 2008a). In one measure of school quality, of all MTO movers, only ten percent attended schools with above-average test scores, while eighty-eight percent of Gautreaux I attended such schools. This lack of change in school quality had the effect of weakening the treatment that children received in their schooling (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006).

While nearly all Gautreaux children changed school districts, only 30 percent of the MTO children did so (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). The policy context of “school choice” programs facilitated this result: the programs allowed students to attend their original schools, even with a new address. All five MTO cities had citywide school districts with school choice programs (Duncan and Zuberi 2006), which allowed MTO movers to continue sending their children to
schools in old neighborhoods even if they did move. Thus, neighborhood quality often improved much more than school quality for children (Duncan and Zuberi 2006). In seeking to understand the decision of many parents to keep children in their original schools, Briggs and colleagues describe the “information poverty” and different standards of evaluation used by mover parents, many of whom lacked a strong educational background (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008) or information about the school system (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). These parents’ views on school choice were informed by a focus on safety in school or stability in their children’s schools, versus the school’s orientation towards academic achievement (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). Additionally, parents sought to keep children in old schools because of relatives who could provide after-care or to keep old friends (Duncan and Zuberi 2006). Likewise, Gautreaux II children had limited school change as many movers stayed inside the city limits (Snyderman 2003) and in the same district. School choice policy was also a factor here; students in the program were allowed to continue in the same school system or even the same school as before their moves; accordingly, many did not even change schools (DeLuca 2010).

Furthermore, moving to suburbs and changing census tracts did not necessarily imply changes in school quality, particularly for MTO families. Housing in suburbs where MTO families moved may have been affordable because of the declining school system of these areas. In such areas, more affluent residents chose to send their children to private schools, rendering the public

Table 8.
Weak Treatment and Weak Educational Effects of MTO and Schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gautreaux I*</th>
<th>Moving to Opportunity</th>
<th>Gautreaux II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Movers with School District Change</td>
<td>~100%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Movers Attending Schools with Above Average Test Scores</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Educational Outcomes</td>
<td>Improved test scores, college track, college attendance and graduation rate; constant grades with higher standards.</td>
<td>No overall significant impacts on reading or math test scores 4-7 years after baseline.</td>
<td>Unlikely,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data refers to Gautreaux I “experimental” suburban movers. Source: DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2001; Sanbonmatsu et al.2006; Duncan and Zuberi 2006.
schools more similar to origin neighborhood schools (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006). Likewise, given the less marked change in overall poverty rates and social environment of the destination neighborhoods in MTO (see Table 2), the quality of public schools in these communities may not have offered children higher educational norms or high-performing schools (Briggs, Comey and Weismann 2008; Sanbonmatsu et al. 2006).

Finally, retention of neighborhood treatments is another crucial aspect of educational improvement, particularly given the “catch up” period that inner-city children in Gautreaux I required (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). In Gautreaux I, changes were seen after a period of seven to ten years (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010) and many movers were in neighborhoods long enough for the educational outcomes to accrue. However, as Table 5 makes clear, in both MTO and Gautreaux II, only a small percentage of program participants retained neighborhood effects for a period of four to seven years. Thus, even participants successfully moved to new districts with better schools were not likely to retain the effects (Briggs and Freeman 2008).

**Employment Outcomes**

Like educational outcomes, the lack of improved employment outcomes of MTO and Gautreaux II were related to the weakened neighborhood-change treatment based on social and spatial distance. Reconciling the “spatial mismatch” of jobs was one way that Gautreaux I movers gained employment (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010; Mendenhall et al. 2006), for new neighborhoods were in different labor markets than their origin neighborhoods (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). Movers even reported finding jobs just by walking around their neighborhoods (Keels et al. 2005), which were distant socially and spatially from the participants’ origin neighborhoods. Additionally, different neighborhood environments, norms, and role models (Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991) affected Gautreaux I participants and pushed them towards employment. Recent studies suggest there may be a “threshold effect” (Galster et al. 2000) in labor outcomes regarding both the spatial mismatch and social environment: improvements in employment require a treatment condition above a certain neighborhood threshold. Where Mendenhall et al. (2006) found significant results in increased likelihood of holding a job and decreased welfare dependency, participants had moved to “low-black, high-resource” neighborhoods with a significant level of affluence, not merely not-poor neighborhoods.

Thus, necessary changes in a neighborhood’s labor market as well as the potential need to exceed a certain “threshold” can explain the differential employment outcomes in the programs, which line up with different neighborhood treatments. In MTO, a move to a low-poverty tract did not necessarily mean relocating to a job-rich zone (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010, 207), or even a different labor market (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). In Gautreaux II, the “undoing of initial advantages” of neighborhood treatments by secondary moves is not promising for changes in employment based on neighborhood treatment (Duncan and Zuberi 2006, 115).
The mechanisms behind employment effects, such as reconciliation of the spatial mismatch (Kain 1968; Holzer 1991) or social environment (Rosenbaum and Popkin 1991) require that neighborhood changes (treatments) remain stable over a significant period of time. As Clampet-Lundquist and Massey note in their study of economic self-sufficiency, though a variety of neighborhood-effects mechanisms have been hypothesized to account for improved self-sufficiency, “they all have in common that they require time to operate” (2008, 135). Moreover, lack of retention in many cases suggests that participants were unable to negotiate childcare, transportation and employment demands while in their new addresses, and, as a result, needed to move closer to kin networks (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010; Boyd 2008; Reed, Pashup, and Snell 2005).

Furthermore, in MTO, contextual factors shaped the employment results for experiment participants. Given the experimental design of MTO, these movers were studied against control participants. However, the control group had a one-hundred percent increase in employment (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010; Orr et al. 2003) during this time, thus mitigating the role of potential neighborhood effects (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008). This major increase by the control group has been linked to the economic boom of the 1990s and welfare cuts, which improved the employment prospects of the low-income population as a whole (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010).

Learning from Distances, Durability and Benchmark Outcomes

What can we learn from evaluating the neighborhood treatments and retention of treatments by program participants? Firstly, we see that solely refining program guidelines of “opportunity” neighborhoods is not an effective “quick fix” to residential mobility policies. As illustrated by Gautreaux II, without addressing the external barriers to leasing up, programs will find that participants are often unable to reconcile the paradox of opportunity and affordability, particularly if strict racial and economic guidelines are in place. Program interventions are thus a crucial element in refining policy for the future, and in particular I stress a return to the unit-based design of Gautreaux I. In evaluating the contextual barriers to leasing up and securing an address in an opportunity neighborhood, I therefore part from DeLuca et al. (2010), who claim that MTO families failed to find housing in mostly white or integrated suburban communities “even though their housing vouchers enabled them to do so” (2010, 21, emphasis mine). While I agree that in some cases these vouchers “enabled” families to make these moves, in many cases structural conditions obstructed the ability to use these vouchers, particularly to white or integrated suburban neighborhoods.

The comparison between MTO, Gautreaux I, and Gautreaux II, while disappointing in outcomes of the latter two programs, can also be seen as fundamentally hopeful for future policy. Through this analysis, we learn that the life chances of the poor do depend on “where they live in addition to who they are” (DeLuca et al. 2010). However, because of external barriers, mobility programs often deliver weakened neighborhood-change treatments if strong inter-
ventions are not instated through program design. These weakened treatments, in turn, “stack the deck against the detection of neighborhood effects” (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008, 135). Furthermore, weak neighborhood treatments do not provide an adequate test of neighborhood effects.

In their analysis of past residential mobility policies, Duncan and Zuberi conclude that “Gautreaux I proves that families, placed in affluent, integrated and much safer neighborhoods, are able to build new lives for themselves and maintain these residential successes” (2006, 120). My analysis confirms this conclusion, as well as underlines the structural conditions, program interventions, and differences in retention that provided the stronger “treatment dose” in Gautreaux I than MTO or Gautreaux II. As I have argued, Gautreaux II and MTO do not prove that neighborhood effects are irrelevant to the current housing policy climate. Rather, Gautreaux II and MTO prove that weak treatments will have weak impacts for educational and employment outcomes. Rather than disproving the role of neighborhood effects on individuals, these programs instead confirm the importance of strategizing around external barriers in residential mobility policies.

But this is far from the final word on neighborhood effects. Missing from the literature are housing mobility programs that replicate Gautreaux I and its strong test of neighborhood effects, including intervention into antecedent conditions, particularly housing supply. Indeed, Briggs et al. argue that such intervention is a necessary condition for successful residential mobility programs (2010, 226). Future programs must also implement a unit-based design that will allow program staff to negotiate directly with landlords, increase housing supply, and offer landlords incentives for participating in housing voucher programs (Sterken 2009).

Future policy can be crafted to truly test the role of neighborhood effects by replicating the Gautreaux I model in conjunction with an understanding of the role of external barriers. However, without such experiments, theories about the geography of opportunity and the concentration of poverty remain open to question. Gaining this understanding of neighborhood effects, which play out in small towns, sprawling suburbs, and city ghettos across the nation, is therefore a crucial initiative for policymakers, social scientists and concerned citizens more broadly. The next step is clear. The question now becomes: do we have the will to take it?
Notes

1. Therefore, MTO had an experimental design, unlike the “quasi-experimental” nature of Gautreaux I. Gautreaux I was studied by comparing program participants who had been moved to city neighborhoods (“controls”) versus those who had been moved to suburbs (“experiments”). This quasi-experimental nature came about during periods when housing counselors found it difficult to find housing for participants in the suburbs. During these periods, the program adjusted its guidelines to allow neighborhoods that were high-poverty and segregated but judged to be improving to become placement locations (DeLuca et al. 2010). Because the program assigned these city neighborhoods to participants on a random basis, Rosenbaum exploited these different placements for his research (see 1991, 1995, 2000, 2010). Although Rosenbaum’s approach has correctly been revised in more recent analyses of administrative data (i.e. Mendenhall et al. 2006), we might expect differences between an affluent suburb and the a true control neighborhood to be more, rather than less, apparent than in Rosenbaum’s study.

2. In all three samples, program participants were almost universally single-female-parent households (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000; Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010; Reed et al. 2005). In the MTO sample in LA and New York, the sample is both black and Hispanic; in Boston <20% of participants are non-white or Asian; in Chicago and Baltimore samples are almost 100% black (Briggs, Popkin and Goering 2010). In Gautreaux I, all participants were black (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz 2000). In Gautreaux II, samples were almost entirely black, with 1 or 2 families of Puerto Rican or Caribbean descent (Reed et al. 2005).

3. Much has been discussed in the literature of improved mental health of behalf of MTO participants. However, as this was not a measured outcome of Gautreaux I, I have chosen not to include it in my analysis, although I do not minimize the importance of the improved safety and decreased stress for female participants of MTO. See Popkin, Leventhal and Weismann 2010.

4. Although class had not been specified, as previously noted, the Gautreaux I placement neighborhoods had on average only 5% of the population below the poverty rate, a lower percent of census tract below the poverty than in either of MTO or Gautreaux II, which both had explicit poverty-rate requirements, see Table 4.

5. Vacancy rates are computed as the percentage of the total number of vacant housing units out of the total number of units.

6. FMR limits are determined by HUD, and are typically dollar amount below which 40 percent of the standard-quality rental housing units are rented (Dept. of Housing and Urban Development).

7. I limit the discussion of inner-ring suburbs to MTO due to the lack of data available of all Gautreaux II placements.

8. Additionally, these communities appear to be potential sites for housing mobility programs given that they are closer in class criteria to the Gautreaux I placement neighborhoods. However, this question of placing black participants in thriving black suburbs, though fascinating, has yet to be successfully tested in the current scholarship, with the largest test being MTO which, as I have argued, failed to test the effects of affluent suburbs on mover participants.

9. Some may ask whether I have stated this problem in the wrong causal direction—could Orfield’s observations about the 1992-1997 period be the product of MTO’s mobility vouchers for low-income individuals, thus driving the poor into the suburbs and causing this trend? This hypothesis fails, however, in that that Orfield’s analysis includes non-MTO cities, e.g. Minneapolis, Atlanta, Denver and San Francisco and still finds the same pattern with which MTO cities, e.g. Chicago and New York, fit into the larger national pattern.

10. As my concern here was on the “mismatch” between black and white preferences, I removed the “other” racial respondents from my analysis.

11. Interestingly, this was also the logic is also behind the racial proxy design of original Gautreaux experiment: neighborhoods with fewer blacks (<30%) would yield greater resources and opportunity and that neighborhoods with percentage blacks

75
12. As Orfield notes: "To reiterate, this is not because middle-class blacks and Latinos inherently destabilize a community"… but because housing rates will fall "if middle-class whites are not also interested in that market" (2002: 14).

13. Certainly some stable, middle-to-upper-class predominately black or Latino suburbs would have been fine placement neighborhoods, but due to minimal numbers of such suburbs, such areas could not likely "receive" movers of an entire housing
Sources


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